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Comparisons of race relations in Brazil and North America (United States) 
have a long history. As Thomas Skidmore’s classic Black into White made clear, 
Brazilian writers and intellectuals were already drawing such comparisons by the 
late 1800s; and Gilberto Freyre’s direct observations of Jim Crow segregation 
in the United States south provided the implicit backdrop to his seminal portrait 
of Brazilian race relations in Casa grande e senzala (1933) and Sobrados e 
mocambos (1936). Meanwhile North American observers, ranging from former 
President Theodore Roosevelt to African-American writers and journalists, were 
commenting on patterns of race in Brazil and contrasting those patterns, either 
implicitly or explicitly, to race relations in the United States.1 
Such comparisons continued into the second half of the 1900s, generating 
an important body of scholarly literature to which Skidmore has been a major 
contributor. Beginning in 1972, at the same moment that Carl Degler was win-
ning acclaim for his analysis of the “mulatto escape hatch” and his assertion 
that the “the mulatto was the key” to understanding differences between Brazil 
and the United States, Skidmore acknowledged the importance of the mulatto 
racial group but insisted that there was much more to the (comparative) story. 
In order to understand race in the two countries, he suggested, we have to move 
beyond race per se to consider multiple historical factors (“contrasting socio-
economic contexts,” demography, regional differences within each country, the 




Twenty years later, in 1993, Skidmore proposed a full-scale revision of the 
Brazil/United States comparison by questioning longstanding assumptions of 
a fundamental difference between the two racial systems. Noting the increase 
in the previous 10-20 years in the number and flexibility of racial categories 
and identities in US society, and proposals in Brazil to group pardos and pretos 
together in a single negro racial category, Skidmore asked whether the contrast 
between “bi-racial USA [and] multi-racial Brazil” was “still valid.”3
He concluded that article by predicting that, in the area of race, Brazil and 
the United States will “continue to offer historians and social scientists a rich 
panorama for comparative analysis.” Yet as he also recognized, the US/Brazil 
comparison is not without its pitfalls, particularly for our understanding of Bra-
zil. When those comparisons began, at the turn of the twentieth century, racial 
exclusion and inequality were so extreme in the United States that Brazil could 
indeed look racially “democratic” by comparison. But if during the first half of 
the 1900s Brazil benefited from the comparison with the United States, during 
the second half of the century the balance shifted. Anti-racist movements and 
state action in the United States formed a new racial standard against which 
Brazil could now be measured and found to fall short.4 
In both instances, condemnation (of the US during the first half of the 1900s 
and Brazil during the second) was surely justified. But using national compari-
sons in this way runs the risk of obscuring and minimizing shortcomings of the 
“model” society, as well as obscuring the genuine achievements in the society 
being condemned: for example, in the case of the Jim Crow US, the growth of 
the African-American middle and working classes that would generate the anti-
racist movements of mid-century; or in the case of Brazilian racial democracy, 
the relatively high levels of cross-racial social contact and convivência that 
the US has yet to achieve and that form one of the most attractive aspects of 
Brazilian society.5 
How might our understandings of race in Brazil change if we were to shift the 
comparative optic away from the United States and toward some other point(s) 
of reference? One model for such a shift is suggested by Skidmore’s work on an 
entirely different topic: the role of organized labor in national politics. In a 1979 
essay, “Workers and Soldiers: Urban Labor Movements and Elite Responses in 
Twentieth-Century Latin America,” Skidmore compared labor/state relations 
in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile during the first half of the 1900s. As always, 
the analysis was sharp and provocative, questioning the “prevailing historical 
wisdom about passive masses [and] shrewdly manipulative elites” at the time. 
Skidmore concluded that “historians have underrated the mass mobilizations of 
urban workers” and the effects of those mobilizations on national politics.6
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That essay was prescient in sounding several of the themes that would domi-
nate Latin American labor historiography in the 1980s and 90s: in particular, 
the themes of worker agency and the impacts of that agency and of labor-based 
movements on national politics.7 The essay also followed a comparative approach 
that differs from Skidmore’s work on race, comparing Brazil not to the United 
States but to its Spanish American neighbors. What if we were to apply that 
same comparative logic to the study of race? And what if we were to adopt as 
well that article’s focus on non-elite agency, mass-based political mobilization, 
and the impacts of both on national politics? 
The comparative literature on race in Brazil and the US not infrequently 
contrasts the experiences of recent (post-1950) black civil rights movements in 
the two countries, noting their greater strength and effectiveness in the United 
States.8 But when we shift the comparative frame away from the United States 
and toward Spanish America, we notice immediately a provocative finding of 
much of the recent research on the Spanish-speaking countries: that people of 
African ancestry have taken part in national politics not primarily through racially 
defined “black” movements but rather through larger cross-racial coalitions such 
as independence armies, labor movements, and reformist political parties. While 
those movements were not “racial” in character, the policies and programs that 
they enacted had important racial consequences, and large political consequences 
as well. What do we see when we compare some of those experiences of cross-
racial mobilization to their counterparts in Brazil? What conclusions, and what 
new questions, might such a comparison suggest, both about Brazil and about 
Spanish America? 
This essay seeks to explore some of the possibilities of intra-Latin American 
comparison by looking at four instances of popular mobilization in the region’s 
history: the struggles for national independence; “popular liberal” movements 
in the 1800s; labor-based populism in the 1900s; and recent (post-1970) black 
civil rights movements.
Independence (Soldiers I)
In Spanish America, independence wars were momentous political events, 
both for the newly independent nations and for their slave and free black citi-
zens. In Mexico, Cuba, Colombia, Venezuela, Argentina, and other countries, 
it was through military service in those wars that free blacks and mulattoes 
achieved their principal political objective: the striking down of the colonial 
caste laws that had consigned them to legal and social inferiority. And it was 
through military service that slaves took the first steps toward the abolition of 
14 E.I.A.L. 19–1
slavery, through the ending of the African slave trade and the Free Womb laws 
enacted at that time.9 
Military service was initially channeled through the black militia units cre-
ated by Spain during the 1600s and early 1700s and then expanded in the late 
1700s. Especially during that period of expansion, militia units emerged as a 
potent vehicle of community mobilization and political action, lobbying Spanish 
officials for land rights, tax exemptions, legal fueros, and other concessions.10 
When independence wars began in 1810, rebel leaders recognized in the militias 
a potent source of potential support, both political and military, and in most 
colonies quickly moved to strike down the racial laws that had been one of the 
main sources of free black discontent during the late colonial period. 
As the independence wars dragged on, rebel leaders realized that they would 
need not just free black support to defeat Spain but support from slave troops 
and the slave population as well. Seeking that support, Chile and Argentina 
enacted gradual emancipation laws in 1811 and 1813, respectively; rewarding 
slave military service in the wars, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador did 
so shortly after independence, in 1821. (Having learned to its cost the impor-
tance of slave political and military support, Spain enacted a similar such law 
early in the first Cuban independence war, in 1870.) These laws provided that 
children of slave mothers would be born legally free, though required to serve 
their mother’s master until the age of majority, at which point they would acquire 
full freedom. The laws thus represented a hard-fought compromise between the 
interests of the slave population, which desired immediate and unconditional 
freedom, and those of slave owners, who wished to continue appropriating their 
slaves’ labor. Under the Free Womb laws, owners retained control over their 
slaves and their labor; slaves obtained their children’s eventual freedom, while 
continuing to pursue their own individual freedom through purchase, military 
service, or other means. 
As in Spanish America, free Afro-Brazilians served in colonial militia units; 
and, as in Spanish America, those units were recruited into the independence 
forces that expelled Portuguese troops from Bahia in 1822-23. But in comparison 
to the Spanish American wars, which lasted for a decade or more and extended 
across vast swathes of territory, independence struggles in Brazil were much 
more limited in scope and did not require the extensive mobilization of free 
black troops. Except for a battalion of slave soldiers in Bahia, slaves were not 
mobilized at all.11 
Brazilian independence thus produced racial outcomes both different from and 
similar to those of Spanish American independence. While Spanish Americans 
were taking the first steps toward ending slavery, Brazil made no moves at all 
in that direction. On the contrary: at the same time that the newly independent 
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Spanish American nations were abolishing their African slave trades, more 
Africans arrived in Brazil (431,000 in the 1820s) than at any previous time 
in the country’s history; and imports continued strong in the 1830s and 40s.12 
Thus while slavery was in full decline in independent Spanish America, it was 
growing to its highest levels ever in Brazil. 
Outcomes for free Afro-Brazilians paralleled those in Spanish America: in 
declaring juridical and civic equality for all Brazilian citizens, the Constitution 
of 1824 effectively struck down the colonial caste laws.13 Yet this similarity does 
raise a comparative question: overturning the caste laws in Spanish America 
required a full-scale conflagration and widespread military mobilization.14 How, 
then, was such a momentous step taken in Brazil in the absence of those condi-
tions? Was the issue of racial equality debated at all in the Constituent Assembly? 
If so, in what terms? Or was it simply imposed by Pedro I and his advisors? 
Or, alternatively, did the writers of the 1824 constitution implicitly assume 
that, just as constitutional guarantees of citizenship and equality were understood 
not to apply to women and slaves, they did not apply to free blacks and mulattoes 
either? Such a possibility is suggested by the public order statutes handed down 
by the Ministry of Justice in 1825, which set different curfew hours for whites 
and blacks and called for police to repress all public gatherings that threatened 
public order, “especially gatherings of blacks, slave or free.”15 But aside from 
such occasional slips, there is little evidence of federal or provincial efforts 
to enact or enforce racially discriminatory laws following independence, and 
one does find evidence of government efforts to enforce racial equality.16 From 
which we may conclude that the Constitution’s guarantees of equality were 
intended to include blacks and mulattoes and thus did represent a rejection of 
colonial practice.
Why did Brazilian elites take this step? In the absence of research on this 
point, one hypothesis might be that, just as in Spanish America, black military 
service was a principal consideration in the decision to concede equality to free 
blacks.17 That military service would be aimed, however, not at the imperial 
metropole but at the enemy within: the country’s slave population. By 1810 
Brazil already had Latin America’s largest slave population, both in absolute 
terms (over 700,000) and as a proportion of the national population (37 per-
cent).18 And as we have seen, between 1820 and 1850 more Africans arrived in 
the country than ever before. Under these conditions Brazilian elites devoted 
considerable thought, not to say preoccupation, to the “state of domestic war” 
that existed between masters and their slaves, and to the possibility, fearsomely 
exemplified by Saint Domingue, that domestic war might escalate into public 
civil war.19 Should that happen, political and military support from the free black 
population would be absolutely essential in defeating the slaves. In an effort to 
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obtain such support, and to ensure that the free population would remain united 
in confronting potential slave rebellion, Brazilian elites conceded equality to 
free people of color.20 
Popular Liberalism (Soldiers II)
In Brazil as in Spanish America, striking down the caste laws opened the door 
to free black participation in national politics. Recent research on nineteenth-
century politics in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and other countries has underlined 
the importance of “popular liberal” movements in those countries and the role 
of free blacks and mulattoes in those movements. “Popular liberals” invoked 
the most radical and egalitarian aspects of liberal ideology and its calls for civic 
equality, democracy, and the rights of citizenship. Forging these elements into a 
harsh critique of the class and racial privileges embodied in colonialism, radical 
liberals found a receptive audience among those groups historically excluded 
from those privileges, prominent among whom were free blacks and mulattoes. 
In Mexico, black militia units from the Pacific coast propelled radical liberal 
Vicente Guerrero to national power in 1829, and then Liberal caudillo Juan Al-
varez in 1855, under whose presidency party leaders initiated the Liberal Reform 
and wrote the Constitution of 1857. Black troops were similarly instrumental in 
bringing Liberal governments to power in Ecuador (José Urbina, 1852), Peru 
(Ramón Castilla, 1853), Colombia (José Hilario López, 1849), and in Venezuela, 
where Liberal forces fought against Conservatives under the rhetorical banner 
of “free land and free men” (land reform and the abolition of slavery).21 
As those Liberal governments took power, they finished the job begun during 
the independence wars, freeing the remaining slaves and definitively abolish-
ing slavery.22 Here we come to another difference between Spanish America 
and Brazil, one that suggests that Brazilian elites’ concession of equality to 
free blacks may well have had its hypothesized political effect. As in Spanish 
America, free Afro-Brazilians were distributed across all sectors of the politi-
cal spectrum but were most visible in the camp of radical liberalism. During 
the 1820s and 30s, people of color were prominent in the anti-Portuguese and 
anti-monarchical street demonstrations in Rio de Janeiro and in the federalist 
rebellions in the Northeast, where “the most radical elements, those who imag-
ined a republican Brazil, or at least a federalist Brazil, were pardos from poor or 
middling families.”23 Questions of central authority and local autonomy became 
overlaid with those of race and class privilege: rebels in Maranhão charged that 
the rights of citizenship were enjoyed only by “the Whites and the Rich,” while 
“all the people of Color, whom they habitually despise, suffer the heavy yoke of 
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absolutism and slavery.” Rebels in Bahia in 1837 denounced the government’s 
“warring against us because they are whites, and in Bahia there must be no 
blacks and mulattos, especially in office, unless they are very rich and change 
their liberal opinions.”24
In their political and racial dynamics, these federalist rebellions—the War of 
the Cabanos in Pernambuco (1832-35), the Cabanagem revolt in Pará (1835-40), 
the Balaiada in Maranhão (1835-40), the Sabinada in Bahia (1837-38)—were 
the Brazilian analogue of the Liberal/Conservative civil wars that convulsed 
much of Spanish America at the same time. But while in Spanish America those 
wars produced final abolition, in Brazil they did not. The rebellions did have 
destabilizing impacts on Brazilian slavery, in much the same way as the Spanish 
American independence and civil wars. Slaves took advantage of the fighting 
between rebel and government forces, and the resulting turmoil in the plantation 
zones, to flee to quilombos. Upon hearing the radical rhetoric of the rebel forces, 
many volunteered to join the rebels; in Maranhão and Pernambuco they formed 
the hard core of the rebel forces and were the last to lay down their arms. Even 
in the face of this slave support, however, none of the rebel movements ever 
called for or advocated abolition, and the rebels in Pará actively repressed slave 
rebellion and runaways. Nor was the victorious central government inclined (at 
that time) to take any action against the institution on which Brazilian society, 
polity, and economy were based.25 
Why was abolition a core demand of radical liberalism in Spanish America 
but not in Brazil? Answering this question will require more research on radical 
liberalism in Brazil, asking questions similar to those driving the recent work 
on Spanish America: Who were the radical liberals? What was the racial and 
class composition of that movement? What were its relations—social, politi-
cal, and economic—with the moderate and conservative groups against which 
it contended?26 
One reason for Brazilian liberals to distance themselves from abolition was 
a direct consequence of Brazilian independence and of the nation’s failure to 
abolish slavery or the African slave trade at that time. While slave populations 
in independent Spanish America were declining in number and becoming more 
Creole and less African, slave populations in Brazil were doing the opposite: 
growing in size and becoming more African, which was to say more alien, 
threatening, and potentially dangerous. As had become clear during the 1835 
Muslim revolt in Salvador, even native-born Brazilian slaves shied away from 
political alliances with the Africans, whom they saw as culturally and ethnically 
different from themselves. This was even more the case with the native-born 
free population, who saw little commonality between themselves and enslaved 
Africans. As a result, the only rebels to call for abolition were those in Bahia, 
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and they only did so during the final days of the rebellion, in a desperate bid for 
slave support in the face of imminent defeat by government forces. Even then, 
their proposed abolition applied only to Brazilian-born slaves; Africans were 
to remain in chains.27 
The majority-African composition of Brazil’s slave population undercut 
support not just for abolition but for radical liberalism as well. One effect of 
free black and slave participation in the federal rebellions of the 1830s was to 
alienate initial elite and middle-class support for those movements. As a result, 
while liberal forces in Spanish America generally won their civil wars, none 
of the Brazilian rebellions of the 1830s was successful. Unable (it appears—
again, we need more research on these movements) to build alliances across the 
class, racial, and ethnic divisions created in Brazilian society by slavery, radical 
liberalism consistently went down to defeat. Abolition, when it came to Brazil, 
would have to come by some other route than Liberal/Conservative civil war 
and military mobilization. 
Abolition (Activists I)
That route was defined and charted by a most unexpected (given Brazil’s 
previous history) development: the only mass-based abolitionist movement in 
Latin America, and one of the largest such movements anywhere in the West-
ern Hemisphere.28 By 1870 the country was experiencing “a proliferation of 
emancipationist clubs, the beginnings of anti-slavery journalism, and frequent 
anti-slavery meetings.”29 This initial mobilization, based mainly in the white, 
urban middle class, was instrumental in obtaining the passage of a Free Womb 
law in 1871. During the 1880s, the movement broadened its racial and class 
composition, drawing on middle-class Afro-Brazilian activists such as Luís 
Gama, José do Patrocínio, André Rebouças, and Luís Anselmo da Fonseca, and 
on urban workers. After Afro-Brazilian port workers in Ceará refused to load 
slaves on to ships bound for São Paulo, the state was swept in 1882 by a wave 
of abolitionist mobilization that persuaded owners to free almost every slave in 
the state. Similar campaigns were launched in towns and cities in southern Brazil 
and then spread into the countryside, where abolitionists in Rio de Janeiro, São 
Paulo, and other provinces appealed to the slaves to join them in a campaign of 
massive civil disobedience. Slaves seized the opportunity, fleeing en masse from 
the plantations and taking refuge in free zones in nearby towns and cities.30 
Writing in June 1888, less than a month after the passage by Parliament of the 
Golden Law decreeing abolition, the São Paulo newspaper Rebate described the 
law as “no more than the legal sanctioning, so that public authority wouldn’t be 
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discredited, of an act that had already been consummated by the mass revolt of 
the slaves.” “Quite rare in our land, the executive branch being the mere execu-
tor of a decree by the people,” the Diário Popular commented the day after the 
law was passed. The Estado de S. Paulo concurred: “A mass-based movement, 
deeply and profoundly of the people, and spread over the entire vastness of our 
country, we have but one example in our history, and that is the movement that 
on May 13, 1888, achieved its glorious ratification, and its recognition by the 
government.”31 
The triumph of the abolitionist movement was unique not just in Brazilian 
history, but in all Latin America. Through peaceful, mass-based civic action, 
free and slave Brazilians came together to achieve what in almost every other 
American country (including Haiti and the United States) required years of 
warfare and bloodshed. This was an expression of political and civic democracy 
and coalition-building not to be forgotten or passed over lightly. It also marked 
the entry onto the political stage of a social group that had not hitherto exerted 
much influence on Brazilian politics but that would assume an ever greater role 
in the 1900s: urban workers.
Workers
Skidmore’s 1979 essay, “Workers and Soldiers,” was one of the first efforts 
to think in cross-national comparative terms about the labor movements that 
formed in Latin America (as in much of the Atlantic world) between 1880 and 
1930.32 In Latin America that wave of unionization was driven by the dramatic 
expansion of the region’s export economies. On a scale greater than ever before, 
workers came together to produce, process, and transport massive quantities of 
export goods: meat and grains from Argentina and Uruguay; coffee from Brazil, 
Colombia, Central America, and the Caribbean; sugar from Cuba, Brazil, and 
other countries; oil from Mexico and Venezuela; bananas from Central America 
and Colombia; and other commodities. 
These workers were of all races and ethnicities, ranging from native-born 
white, black, brown, and indigenous Latin Americans to immigrants from Europe, 
Asia, and the non-Hispanic Caribbean. As these workers migrated within their 
own countries or across the oceans to Latin America, they created multi-ethnic 
labor forces that varied greatly in composition from country to country but were 
almost always characterized by ethnic and cultural diversity. 
The first generation of labor historians tended to see diversity, and perceived 
divisions among different racial and ethnic groups, as one of the principal ob-
stacles to the construction of unions in the region.33 There is certainly some truth 
20 E.I.A.L. 19–1
to that observation. Racial and ethnic differences were perceived as quite real by 
workers at the time, as they still are by many people today. Not a few employ-
ers exploited those differences to prevent unionization; in other cases, workers 
themselves refused to cross perceived ethnic boundaries to join with members 
of other groups.34 But recent research has also called to our attention instances in 
which workers and organizers overcame those differences to create cross-racial 
labor movements, and the surprising frequency with which they did so. 
Such research is most advanced in Cuba, where historians have noted both 
the extreme ethnic diversity of early-twentieth-century labor forces and work-
ers’ repeated efforts to mobilize across racial lines. On the sugar plantations, for 
example, workers were of all complexions and nationalities, including Chinese, 
Spaniards, Haitians, Jamaicans, and black, brown, and white Cubans. Under such 
circumstances, and especially in light of the rigors of the Cuban sugar economy, 
mobilizing across racial lines would seem an unlikely option. Yet as early as 
the 1902 sugar workers’ strike, and continuing through the massive mobiliza-
tions of the 1930s, organizers worked to overcome the divisions among Cuban, 
Spanish, and West Indian workers. Many of those organizers were themselves 
Afro-Cuban, who by the 1930s and 40s emerged as some of the leading figures 
in the island’s unions: Jesús Menéndez, head of the sugar workers’ union; Ar-
acelio Iglesias, head of the dock workers; Lázaro Peña, secretary-general of the 
national labor federation (CTC); Blas Roca, secretary-general of the Communist 
party; and others.35 
Cross-racial movements involving large numbers of Afro-Spanish Americans 
were by no means confined to Cuba. Oil workers’ unions in Venezuela mobi-
lized Venezuelan workers of all races alongside Afro-Caribbean workers from 
Dutch- and English-speaking islands. Banana worker unions along Colombia’s 
Caribbean coast mobilized a work force drawn from the local Afro-Colombian 
population, indigenous laborers from the Guajira peninsula, and mestizo migrants 
from the highlands. So strong was the association between nonwhite racial 
status and the Colombian labor movement that when (mestizo) national labor 
leader Jorge Gaitán was scornfully dismissed by Conservative leaders as “el 
negro Gaitán,” he embraced the term and made it a centerpiece of his rhetorical 
assaults on the oligarquía.36 
Initially opposed and repressed by national governments, by the 1930s and 40s 
these multiracial labor movements formed the core of populist political move-
ments and ruling national political coalitions: Acción Democrática in Venezuela, 
the left-Liberal governments of Alfonso López in Colombia, Fulgencio Batista’s 
administrations in Cuba, Luis Muñoz Marín’s Partido Popular Democrático in 
Puerto Rico, and others. These governments were responsible for the populist 
social and economic programs enacted at that time, and responsible as well for 
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the doctrines of racial democracy that dominated mid-century Latin American 
racial thought. 
The causes and consequences of these developments require much more 
research attention than they have received to date. It is clear, for example, that 
black workers were numerically important in organized labor and in populism. 
It is far less clear whether racial questions emerged in those movements, and if 
so, how they were dealt with. To what degree, and in what ways, did workers 
and their movements openly discuss and confront questions of racial difference? 
To what degree were Latin American labor movements formally or informally 
racially egalitarian? How did the racial composition of those movements’ lead-
ership compare to the racial composition of the members? And what was the 
relationship, if any, between the multiracial character of the region’s labor 
movements and the adoption of racial democracy as a core element of national 
identity? Like social security, public health, state-provided housing, and other 
populist reforms, was racial democracy a project formulated and “granted” to 
unions by national political and intellectual elites? Was it a “bottom-up” product 
of cross-racial contact and egalitarian practices in popular movements?37 Or did 
it emerge from other sources?
If such research is necessary for Spanish America, it is needed even more for 
Brazil. Brazil is the archetypal case of a Latin American country with a racially 
mixed labor force and labor movement that eventually came to form the electoral 
basis of national populism. And perhaps more than in any other Latin American 
country, that populist movement, and national thought and practice, are closely 
associated with the ideal of racial democracy. What then, have been the racial 
dynamics of that labor movement and of national populism over time? 
As with Latin American labor historiography more generally, early historians 
of the Brazilian labor movement tended to stress the theme of racial and ethnic 
division within the working class, and the obstacles that such division posed to 
successful mobilization.38 And indeed, studies of movements in Rio de Janeiro 
and São Paulo have found ample evidence of racial tension and conflict between 
European immigrants and native-born Brazilians, and of employers’ exploitation 
of those conflicts to break initial efforts toward unionization.39 Those findings 
make all the more imperative, then, research on how workers were eventually 
able to overcome those divisions to build the racially inclusive movements of 
the 1930s and 40s. Such research must also address whether the racial tensions 
of the early 1900s persisted in later decades. We need to ask the same questions 
of Brazilian unions and labor movements that we ask of Spanish American 
movements: Did they talk openly about race? Did the racial composition of 
the leadership reflect that of the members? Is there evidence of racial tension 
and conflict? And what was organized labor’s relationship, if any, to concepts 
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of racial democracy? Might such concepts have emerged in part out of racially 
egalitarian ideology and practice among workers and their movements? Were 
workers and their movements talking about racial egalitarianism during those 
years in any explicit way? 
Black Movements (Activists II)
In Brazil and Spanish America alike, populist movements supported by 
organized labor instituted social and economic programs that had profound 
consequences for their national societies. State-promoted industrialization gen-
erated economic growth and job opportunities for working and middle classes. 
And increased government expenditure for education, health care, housing, and 
other social goods distributed the results of that growth and opportunity more 
broadly than in previous generations. 
The racial impacts of those policies were striking. Because of the availabil-
ity of census data on race, they are most clearly documented for Brazil, where 
the number of Afro-Brazilian high school graduates increased from 51,000 in 
1950 to 3.3 million in 1991, and the number of college graduates from 4,000 to 
600,000. As a result of increased access to higher education, by 1991, 3.5 million 
Afro-Brazilians (12 percent of the black and brown labor force) were working 
in white-collar occupations.40 Still, this was well below the number of whites 
working in such occupations (8.6 million, 34 percent of all white workers); and 
as they competed for white-collar employment and advancement, Afro-Brazilians 
found themselves significantly disadvantaged. As many studies from the 1970s 
through the present have made clear, black and brown earnings lagged signifi-
cantly behind those of white people with comparable education, experience, 
and other qualifications; and those racial disparities tended to increase at higher 
levels of the job market. The more education and experience black and brown 
workers acquired, the further behind their white competitors they fell, both in 
relative and absolute terms.41
Armed with both statistical and real-life evidence of the barriers obstructing 
their full integration into Brazilian society, a generation of activists, most of 
them with high school or college education, began to create new black move-
ments in the 1970s. Those movements have attracted a good deal of scholarly 
attention, one of the principal conclusions of which has been that Afro-Brazilian 
movements have been relatively weak and less effective in achieving their goals 
than their North American counterparts (and partial inspiration), the US civil 
rights movement.42 
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Evaluations of Brazil’s black movements look quite different, however, if 
we compare them not to the US civil rights movement but to their analogues in 
Spanish America. Beginning in the 1970s, at the same time as the black move-
ments in Brazil, black activists in Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Peru, and 
Uruguay launched movements aimed at combating discrimination and inequality. 
In Colombia, those movements also sought to defend historic Afro-Colombian 
land rights in the Pacific rain forests of the Chocó region. These movements 
have had some significant impact on national debates about race, particularly in 
terms of raising the question of whether racial democracy accurately describes 
race relations in Spanish American countries, or whether it represents an ideal 
yet to be achieved in practice. Black movements in Colombia also succeeded 
in writing protections of black land titles into the Constitution of 1991, along 
with provisions mandating research and teaching on Afro-Colombian history 
and culture.43 
On balance, however, black movements in Spanish America have attracted 
less support, and achieved much less in policy terms, than their counterparts in 
Brazil. Afro-Brazilian movements do not draw on a large political following, 
nor have they displayed much ability to turn out votes. In light of those limita-
tions, however, their achievements are all the more striking. During the 1980s 
they provoked a national debate on racial democracy that, by the 1990s, had 
reached a consensus that the national ideology simply did not correspond to 
the realities of Brazilian race relations. That consensus led President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso in 1996 to proclaim racial equality as one of the goals of his 
National Human Rights Program. He convened an Interministerial Working 
Group of politicians, civil servants, and representatives from civil society to 
design and propose policies to achieve those goals. Among those policies were 
race-based affirmative action programs aimed at increasing black representation 
in education and employment. When those programs proved too controversial 
to be enacted by Congress, they started to be adopted piecemeal in the early 
2000s by individual federal and state agencies (e.g., the Ministries of Agrarian 
Development, Justice, and Foreign Relations), universities, and private firms.44 
Through the Ministry of Agrarian Development, the government has also moved 
to enforce land rights for former quilombo communities to a greater degree than 
in Colombia, where constitutional protections remain largely unenforced, or in 
other countries (e.g., Venezuela, Ecuador, and the Central American countries) 
where black land ownership is equally vulnerable and has no state protection. 
As we survey recent policy outcomes, the Brazil/Spanish America com-
parison not only revises our evaluation of Brazil’s black movements but also 
raises a series of research questions on the Spanish American countries. Black 
movements in those countries arose in response to conditions similar to those in 
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Brazil: increasing black access to higher education, combined with continuing 
racial barriers in employment that prevent black and brown people from fully 
enjoying the fruits of their educational achievements. But if the conditions that 
gave rise to the Spanish American movements were similar to those obtaining 
in Brazil, why have black movements in Spanish America received less sup-
port than in Brazil? Are levels of vocational, educational, and other forms of 
inequality in those countries lower than in Brazil, thus generating less sense of 
racial grievance? Are racial boundaries and identities less clearly defined than 
in Brazil, again lowering Afro-Spanish Americans’ sense of racial grievance? Is 
repression of racial movements greater than in Brazil, making it more difficult for 
them to function? Are potential leaders of Afro-Spanish American movements 
more effectively co-opted than in Brazil, thus depriving black movements of 
leadership? Or to put it more positively, are alternative forms of mobilization—
political parties, labor unions, civic organizations, religious organizations—more 
open to black initiative and concerns in Spanish America than in Brazil? Are 
those organizations in Spanish America already addressing racial issues more 
effectively than similar organizations in Brazil, thus reducing the perceived need 
for racially defined black movements? 
The recent wave of scholarship on post-1970 indigenous movements in 
Spanish America has greatly increased our understanding of the origins of those 
movements and how they have reshaped politics in the region.45 We now need 
similar research on black movements in Spanish America, based in part on 
questions deriving from the indigenous experience and in part on comparisons 
with black movements in Brazil.
Conclusions and Questions 
This essay began by suggesting that shifting our comparative optic away 
from the United States and toward Spanish America will lead to new conclu-
sions and new questions about race in Brazil and Spanish America. Does that 
turn out to be true? 
When we look at the history of race in Brazil in relation not to the United 
States but to Spanish America, the first change that we notice is that Brazil no 
longer looks strange and exotic. When North American historians and social 
scientists consider race in Brazil, it is very hard for us, even with the best will 
in the world, to avoid positing the United States as the norm and Brazil as the 
deviant case. Thus, we ask, if the United States and Brazil both had slavery, and 
the US subsequently developed full-fledged racial segregation imposed by the 
state, then why didn’t Brazil? If Brazil and the United States both had marked 
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racial inequalities in the 1900s, and the United States developed active civil 
rights and Black Power movements in the second half of the century, then why 
didn’t Brazil?46
But when we look at Brazil in relation to Spanish America, its racial history 
no longer looks so strange and unfamiliar. Rather, we see that it is perfectly 
normal for post-emancipation societies to not develop formalized, state-imposed 
systems of racial segregation; what demands explanation is not why societies 
fail to adopt racial segregation, but rather why they do. And when we look at 
Brazil and Spanish America in relation to each other, we see that it is not the 
norm for societies to develop strong, racially defined political movements, even 
in the face of deeply entrenched racial inequality. Our comparative question then 
becomes not why Latin American nations failed to develop such movements, 
but rather why the United States did.47 
Given the commonalities in their histories of Iberian colonialism, of slave law 
based on Roman precedents, of caste laws based on late medieval precedents, of 
Catholicism, of plantation agriculture, of African slavery, and of widespread race 
mixture, it is hardly surprising to find broad overlap between the racial histories 
of Brazil and the Spanish American nations. That broad overlap in turn makes 
the occasional divergences all the more striking.
The first such divergence was the racial outcomes of Spanish American 
and Brazilian independence. Historians of Latin America have long noted the 
distinctiveness of Brazil’s relatively non-violent road to independence, and 
the consequences of that process. While Spanish American viceroyalties dis-
integrated into nations and provinces driven by decades of on-again, off-again 
civil war, Brazil retained its territorial integrity. While the Spanish American 
nations embraced republicanism, Brazil remained a monarchy. And while Span-
ish American nations ended the slave trade and began the gradual abolition of 
slavery, Brazil imported more Africans than ever before.
Amidst these differences, we identified one important similarity: the over-
turning of the caste laws, and official declarations of full civic and racial equal-
ity, in Brazil and Spanish America alike. Those declarations reflect the similar 
grievances and resentments of free nonwhites in both regions, more or less 
equally oppressed by colonial racial laws. Yet in Spanish America those laws 
fell as part of a much larger process of social and political dislocation caused 
by the independence wars, while in Brazil the laws were quietly struck down 
as part of a relatively smooth transition to independence. How do we explain 
that outcome in Brazil, in the absence of the factors driving civic equality in 
Spanish America? Was it the result of reform imposed from above, demanded 
from below, or some combination of the two? Did the overturning of caste laws 
in Spanish America play any role in inspiring similar action in Brazil? The 
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consequences of the Haitian Revolution were well known in Brazil; what about 
the consequences of the Spanish American revolutions? We need research on 
the debates (if any) in the Constituent Assembly, and in Brazilian society more 
generally, on this momentous change.48 
We need research as well on the social and political consequences of civic 
equality. In both Spanish America and Brazil one of the principal such conse-
quences was the strengthening of liberalism’s radical, “popular” wing. While 
popular liberal movements went on to play central roles in politics and state-
building in Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Peru, in Brazil those movements 
were defeated and tamed early (in the 1830s and 40s) and conclusively. One 
reason for that defeat was the greater strength and stability of the Brazilian 
state, as compared to its Spanish American counterparts; but another was the 
refusal of Brazil’s radical liberals to embrace the cause of anti-slavery and to 
make common cause with the slave population. In Spanish America, popular 
liberals appealed directly to the slave and liberto populations and sought to enlist 
them in liberal movements. In Brazil, by contrast, even radical liberals stopped 
short of reaching out to a slave population that, by the 1830s, was still majority 
African. In so doing, they denied themselves a potential source of support that 
might have strengthened their position in Brazilian politics. 
One of the consequences of the defeat of radical liberalism in Brazil was 
the survival of slavery in that country into the 1880s—a third major difference 
between Brazil and Spanish America (leaving aside Cuba, which remained under 
Spanish rule and where slavery therefore persisted until 1886). And a fourth 
major difference: the way in which Brazilian slavery was ultimately overturned. 
While in Spanish America abolition began as a result of the independence wars 
and ended as a product of competition between Liberal and Conservative par-
ties, in Brazil slavery was abolished through the efforts of an abolitionist move-
ment that, in comparison to the Spanish American nations, was unique in its 
composition—multi-class and multiracial, its methods—parliamentary lobbying 
and non-violent civil disobedience, and its impact—the peaceful and definitive 
abolition of the Americas’ second-largest slave system. 
How was this result achieved? Through abolitionist reformers reversing the 
strategy followed by Brazil’s radical liberals a half-century earlier. Rather than 
turning their backs on the slaves, abolitionists reached out to a slave population 
that was now a much smaller proportion of the national population, and much 
more Brazilian in composition, than had been the case in the 1830s. The result 
was a cross-class, cross-racial coalition that achieved one of the greatest social 
and political advances in Brazilian history. 
During the first half of the 1900s, workers in Brazil and Spanish America 
alike created cross-racial labor movements that brought populist regimes to 
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power. Enacting various combinations of social and economic reforms, those 
regimes produced the conditions for a visible expansion in black working and 
middle classes. Black middle classes in particular provided the social base for 
the “new” black movements that appeared in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and other countries in the 1970s and 80s. And here 
we arrive at a final difference between Brazil and Spanish America: that the 
post-1970 Afro-Brazilian movements have been greater in their membership 
and their policy effects than black movements anywhere else in Latin America. 
Far from being a hemispheric laggard in combating racism and inequality, as 
comparisons with the United States tend to suggest, Brazil may in fact be a 
hemispheric leader.49
Such a conclusion, if true, tends to confirm a long-standing tenet of US/
Brazil (and US/South Africa) comparisons: that openly discriminatory racial 
systems are more likely to produce race-based political mobilization. The mas-
sive scale and open brutality of Brazilian slavery, lasting longer than in any 
other American society, generated Latin America’s only mass-based abolitionist 
movement. And just as state-mandated segregation and inequality created the 
context for the rise of the US civil rights movement, so did the overt inequality 
of present-day Brazilian race relations, amply documented in national censuses 
and government statistics, prompt the creation of Latin America’s largest and 
most successful black political movement. 
Should the relative weakness of such movements in Spanish America be 
taken as evidence of lower inequality and greater racial integration in those 
countries? This is one of the questions that future researchers need to answer. 
Are Spanish American nations closer to the goal of racial democracy than Bra-
zil, and thus (relatively) less in need of black movements? And if so, how did 
they get there? Was it through “softer” and/or more egalitarian systems of race 
relations? Was it that multiracial movements of soldiers (in the independence 
and civil wars) and workers (participating in labor movements and voting for 
populist governments), enacting progressive political and economic reforms, 
enabled the Spanish American nations to make greater progress toward racial 
democracy than Brazil? These are some questions waiting for answers.
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